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Open Video Systems: Too Much 
Regulation Too Late? 
Michael Botein* 
There are lessons to be learned from the nonstarters in regulatory 
histo~r A good example in the 1996 Telecommunications Act ~"1996 
Act") was Section 653's creation of open video systems ("OVS"). OVS 
was an attempt to create a quasi-carrier platform, more available to third 
parties than cable but with enough potential profit to encourage investment. 
At least in theory, OVS operators would be subject to less regulation than 
either cable systems or common carriers. OVS turned out to be a flop, 
however, in terms of market share. Five years after passage of the 1996 
Act, OVS had a total of 60,000 subscribers and the number appeared to be 
declining.3 
The experience with OVS is particularly relevant today with the 
potential entry of "fiber to the home" ("FTTH") from incumbent local 
exchange carriers ("ll..ECs"), such as Verizon and AT&T. Both companies 
are in the process of rolling out FTTH systems under rubrics such as FiOS 
(Verizon) or Lightspeed (AT&T), promising high-bandwidth digital video 
and other applications.4 At present, these developments' legal status is less 
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than clear since debate exists as to whether FITH could or should be 
regulated as cable television under the 1996 Act.5 OVS status would be a 
logical approach to regulatory classification, but the ILECs apparently are 
not interested in it-probably for the same reasons which have dissuaded 
past entrepreneurs.6 . 
The background of OVS is less than clear and little in the 1996 Act's 
sparse legislative history sheds much light. The primary impetus seems to 
have been cleaning up after a prior Federal Communications Commission 
("FCC") regulatory experiment-video dialtone ("VDT"). This was an 
attempt to allow the ILECs to market video programming to the home 
through separate subsidiaries? As with OVS, the goal was to bring new 
competition into the multichannel video market, which then was dominated 
by the cable industry. Video dialtone ultimately proved too cumbersome to 
be workable; however, and Congress as well as the Commission went in 
search of a less restrictive regulatory framework, ultimately settling on 
OVS. Section 653 of the 1996 Act thus explicitly invalidated the FCC's 
VDT rules and substituted OVS for them.s 
Although Section 653's intent clearly was to provide regulatory relief, 
its language is not well crafted. As one observer noted, "[t]his is a bizarre 
statute .... ,,9 The law begins by providing that "[a] local exchange carrier 
may provide cable service ... through an open video system ... ," but then 
adds that " ... an operator of a cable system or any other person ... " may 
apply for a certificate to operate an OVS system. 1O 
The statute then goes on to impose or relieve regulatory obligations 
by a series of cross-references. The basic requirements are that an OVS 
.comlFiOSForHomelchannelslFiOS/rootlabouCFiOS.asp (last visited Mar. 3, 2(06). 
5. Much of the confusion stems from the definition of "cable system" within 47 U.S.C. 
§ 522(7) (2000), which excludes "a facility of a common carrier ... to the extent such 
facility is used in the transmission of video programming directly to subscribers, unless the 
extent of such use is solely to provide interactive on-demand services .... " 
6. See infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. 
7. Implementation of Section 302 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 Open Video 
Systems, Second Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 18223 (1996) [hereinafter Open Video 
Systems]. 
8. Telecommunications Act, § 653, 110 Stat. 124 provides: 
The Commission's regulations and policies with respect to video dialtone 
requirements ... shall cease to be effective on the date of enactment of this Act. 
This paragraph shall not be construed to require the termination of any video-
dial tone system that the Commission has approved before the date of enactment of 
this Act. 
9. Monroe Price, Professor of Law at Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Remarks 
at the Open Video Systems and the Media Marketplace Seminar, pt. 1 (May 23, 1996), 
available at hnp:llwww.citi.columbia.edulovstran.htm. (last visited Mar. 3, 2006) 
[hereinafter OVS Seminar]. 
10. 47 U.S.C. § 573(a)(I) (2000). 
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operator offer a form of leased access to third parties on "just and 
reasonable" "rates, terms, and conditions.,,11 This looks very much like a 
form of common carriage under the old Midwest Video II case. 12 The 
Supreme Court held that the FCC's original public access channels were a 
form of common carriage since they required cable operators to deal with 
any qualified third party;13 OVS leased access channel requirements are 
substantially similar. Although the Court has never formally overruled 
Midwest Video II, it also has not invoked it in recent years. 14 
The mirror image of the leased access requirement is that if there is 
demand for two-thirds or more of an OVS system's channels, the operator 
may control no more than one-third of them. IS This obviously gives an 
OVS operator substantially less content control than a cable system, which 
is subject only to requirements of must-carry and public access channels-
a relatively limited number, except in major urban areas.16 The statute also 
requires the Commission to adopt requirements of public, educational, and 
governmental ("PEG") access channels and mandatory carriage of local 
television broadcast stations.17 It also mandates a series of traditional cable 
rules, such as network nonduplication and syndicated exclusivity (now 
repealed). 18 
On the other hand, the statute appeared to relieve OVS operators from 
local regulatory requirements. It allows a city to charge an OVS system 
fees no greater than franchise fees paid by a cable system. 19 The inference 
naturally was that OVS operators were not subject to local franchising-
long a complaint of the cable industry. The Commission supported this 
interpretation, reasoning that Congress had meant to repeal prior legislation 
requiring a cable system to have a local franchise.2o 
The Fifth Circuit, however, quickly changed this result. Dallas v. 
FCC- I held that although the 1996 Act had repealed the federal 
requirement that cable systems obtain a local franchise, "it does not 
eviscerate the ability of local authorities to impose franchise requirements 
11. [d. at § 573(b)(1)(A). 
12. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979). 
13. [d. at 695-96. 
14. See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 
734 (1996) (emphasizing the long history and acceptance of cable access channels). 
15. See 47 U.S.C. § 573(b)(l)(B). 
16. See infra discussion following note 26. 
17. 47 U.S.C. § 573(c)(l)(B). 
18. [d. § 573(b)(1)(D). The FCC repealed the syndicated exclusivity rules in 1981. See 
Malrite T.V. of N.Y. v. FCC, 652 F. 2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981) (upholding the repeal). 
19. § 573(c)(2)(B). 
20. See Open Video Systems, supra note 7, paras. 211-14. 
21. 165 F.3d 341 (5th Cir. 1999). 
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.... ,,22 Since most large cities try to control any entity using their streets, 
the end result is that OVS-like cable--ended up being subject to both 
franchising and franchise fees. One possible difference between the two 
media is that n..ECs already hold franchises for their telephone businesses, 
and thus a FITH offering might be covered by these. Most large cities have 
rejected this argument on the ground that telephone and video services are 
completely different. However, one state court decision gives at least some 
support.23 
Thus, Section 653 was intended to be a "cable light" form of 
regulation, to encourage entry of new ftrms and creation of new 
competition in the multichannel media industry. Its terms as well as 
subsequent interpretation, however, resulted in authorizing a new medium 
on roughly the same regulatory terms as traditional cable television. 
Combined with this lack of real deregulation, market forces may have 
doomed OVS from the beginning. Regardless of the regulatory 
environment, OVS started out with three signiftcant handicaps. 
First, events largely outpaced OVS development. By the end of 1996, 
more than three quarters of U.S. households already had cable, direct 
broadcast satellites, or some other form of multichannel media?4 As a 
result, in most substantial geographic markets OVS was in the position of a 
second entrant, or "overbuilder." This is a historically disfavored position 
in the cable and local telephone exchange markets. To the extent that 
economies of scale exist, the incumbent already has almost all of them. In 
addition, by deftnition the ftrst entrant also has access to prime subscribers 
as well as programmers. And programming may be the most important 
factor in marketing a multichannel medium since by deftnition subscribers 
want more interesting content than traditional broadcasting in the ftrst 
place. Althou~h programmers are legally free as well as required to sell to 
new entrants, 5 most are not anxious to because of their existing relations 
and established billing procedures with cable and other multichannel 
distributors. A second provider thus invariably ftnds it difficult to secure 
good programming-and hence subscribers. Even today, of course, some 
communities do not have even one multichannel video provider. Almost by 
deftnition, however, these are relatively small and rural; as a result, the 
infrastructure costs per subscriber often are prohibitive in light of potential 
revenues. 
22. [d. at 347 (emphasis original). 
23. WH Link, LLC v. Otsego, 664 N.W.2d 390 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003). 
24. Video Programming Report, supra note 3, paras. 5-15. 
25. 47 U.S.c. § 548(c)(2)(C) (2000) (prohibiting exclusive dealing arrangements 
between programmers and multichannel video distributors). 
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Second, OVS' very structure invites programmers to provide content 
on a leased rather than licensed basis. Assuming that an OVS operator 
honored Section 653's requirement of just and reasonable rates to third 
parties?6 it would not be able to extract much profit from a leased channel 
transaction. Cable operators traditionally have fought leased access tooth 
and nail, precisely because licensing is more profitable than leasing-
particularly with pay channels. In addition, a licensing arrangement creates 
opportunities for a system to secure local advertising time on national 
satellite channels, which has turned into twenty percent of the cable 
industry's revenue stream. 
Third, Section 653's set-aside of up to two-thirds of all channels to 
third parties reduces an OVS operator's opportunity to maximize channels 
and thus revenues. This requirement would apply, of course, only if there 
were demand by third parties for two-thirds or more of the channels since 
today about 250 satellite networks are chasing half that number of cable 
channels. However, eighty channels might fill up very quickly. 
Early OVS observers assumed that the medium would develop 
quickly as a broadband digital system. For example, in 1996, former FCC 
Cable Service Bureau Chief Meredith Jones noted that "[w]hat we hear ... 
is that if lOU have a switched digital system, your capacity is virtually 
infinite.,,2 This may be true in the future. But at present, the cost of 
implementing fiber-optic cable as well as video switching is high.28 
At least for the moment, state-of-the-art technology in the cable 
industry still is "hybrid fiber-coax," which uses a fiber backbone and 
coaxial cable to offer a mixture of 125 or more analog and digital 
channels?9 Even this is not inexpensive, with costs running about $1,000-
$1,500 per household.30 
With this amount of capacity under the two-thirds set-aside, OVS is at 
a significant disadvantage to traditional cable.3l In a major urban market, a 
cable system would have to assign about twenty channels to must-carry 
signals and five to PEG access; it would retain 100 or more channels for its 
own use. By comparison, an OVS operator would be under a similar 
requirement, but would control only about forty channels as a result of the 
set-aside-thus leaving it with perhaps fifteen to twenty channels to 
26. See supra discussion accompanying note 11. 
27. OVS Seminar, supra note 9, at Part II. 
28. See Matt Stump, Video's the Rage at Supercomm Confab, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, 
June 13, 2005, at 8, available at http://www.multichannel.comlarticlelCA607888.html. 
29. Michael Botein, The Demise of the Information Superhighway, 11 MEDIA L. & 
POL'y 85, 87-88 (2003). 
30. Id. at 92. 
31. See supra note 15 and accompanying text: 
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program on its own after meeting its must carry and PEG obligations. This 
is not exactly a recipe for profitability. In a 500 channel digital universe, of 
course, the results would be quite different; an OVS operator would retain 
more than 100 channels after satisfying its must carry and PEG obligations. 
However, this still appears to be fairly far off. 
An OVS system thus begins with a significant liability as the second 
entrant, which only exacerbates its problems in acquiring attractive 
programming and hence subscribers. This situation is aggravated by the 
two-thirds set-aside, reducing its available channels. 
OVS' nonstarter status thus is less than surprising. The reasons for 
Section 653's counterproductive provision also are relatively clear in 
hindsight. The drafters simply made a number of wrong assumptions about 
the state of the industries with which they were dealing: they 
underestimated cable's entrenchment and overestimated OVS' ability to 
develop a completely new digital technology in a few years. The ILEes' 
avoidance of OVS thus made a lot of sense. 
This leaves the intriguing question of where things go from here, 
particularly in relation to the ILEes' FITH proposals-a traditional 
common carrier approach washed out with video dialtone. The ILEes had 
no interest in OVS hybrid status, and they clearly do not want to be 
regulated as cable operators. Perhaps there is another, fresh, innovative 
approach, but it does not seem to have surfaced so far. 
